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Abstract
The impact of conflict on population health and health infrastructure has been well documented; however the efforts 
of the international community to rebuild health systems in post-conflict periods have not been systematically 
examined. Based on a review of relevant literature, this paper develops a framework for analyzing health reform in post-
conflict settings, and applies this framework to the case study of health system reform in post-conflict Kosovo. The 
paper examines two questions: first, the selection of health reform measures; and second, the outcome of the reform 
process. It measures the success of reforms by the extent to which reform achieved its objectives. Through an 
examination of primary documents and interviews with key stakeholders, the paper demonstrates that the external 
nature of the reform process, the compressed time period for reform, and weak state capacity undermined the ability 
of the success of the reform program.
Introduction
This paper examines the efforts to rebuild the health sys-
tem in Kosovo after the United Nations established
administrative control of the province in 1999. In many
ways, Kosovo represented the beginning of a new form of
international engagement in countries emerging from
armed conflict. The international community assumed
administrative control of the province, including control
over the health sector. However, unlike other post-con-
flict states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the implement-
ing environment in Kosovo was favourable: high levels of
donor assistance were dispersed, the majority of the pop-
ulation supported the military intervention, and the prov-
ince had reasonably high levels of human capital
concentrated in a small geographic area situated in
Europe. Because of these factors, Kosovo is an optimal
case study to examine the efficacy of international
engagement in post-conflict societies, including health
reform.
Health reform is "sustained, purposive change to
improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of the
health sector with the goal of improving health status,
obtaining greater equity, and obtaining greater cost-effec-
tiveness for services provided" [1]. In the analysis of
health reform in Kosovo, the paper addresses two key
questions:
• Policy Choices: What health policies and pro-
grammes were selected as part of the health reform
effort? Why were these policies selected?
• Policy Outcomes: What factors impacted on the
implementation of the health reform effort? What
were the key successes and failures? Did health
reform achieve its objectives?
The Kosovo health reform program was initially lauded
as a success given the evidence-based, organized, and
orderly nature of the policy generation process [2]. How-
ever, the implementation of these reforms was more
problematic than their creation, and the outcome of
reform has not met its promise. The case study is of inter-
est to policy makers considering reforming health sys-
tems in post-conflict or crisis-affected states. While more
comparative case studies are necessary before concrete
policy recommendations can be developed, the Kosovo
case provides a warning about the complex and difficult
process of transforming and strengthening health sys-
tems.
Methods
As no framework existed to guide the analysis of health
reform in post-conflict settings, the paper first undertook
a literature review to develop this framework. The
authors searched the following sets of literature: the
impact of conflict on health, health reform in Eastern
Europe, and post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuild-
ing efforts. The literature review produced a framework
that identifies how the international engagement in the
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political context.
The literature review also generated the following
hypotheses on the factors that influenced the outcomes
of reform.
H1: External actors drove the health reform process: the
policies selected reflected the objectives of the interna-
tional community.
H2: Donors believed that reform could be achieved in a
compressed time period, and gave more priority to the
design than the implementation of reforms.
H3: State capacity in the post-conflict period is low, and
external actors do not recognize the importance of state
capacity in health reform.
The externally driven nature of the reform process, the
compressed nature of the time period for reform, and low
state capacity undermined the ability of the health reform
program to achieve its objectives.
The health reform process in Kosovo was analyzed
through primary documents and interviews with 26
stakeholders active in the health sector. Local stakehold-
ers were chosen based on their familiarity with the health
reform process--most occupied positions within the Kos-
ovo health system. While the majority of stakeholders
were from Kosovo's capital city of Pristina, stakeholders
from two of Kosovo's municipalities were also inter-
viewed to integrate regional perspectives. The interviews
were designed to evaluate the reform process.
The case study focuses on the initial five year period
following reform (1999-2004) but also discusses the state
of the Kosovo health sector today. This research confirms
these hypotheses by demonstrating that the reform
agenda was externally driven; the reform timetable was
compressed - the international community was attempt-
ing 'too much, too fast,' and government capacity was low
in the post-war social and political context. In addition to
confirming these hypotheses, the research also found that
the extreme politicization of the health sector impeded
reform progress.
Framework for Reform
Post-conflict health reform remains an under-researched
area, and as such, there are no pre-existing frameworks
that analyze how health interventions interact with the
post-conflict social, political and economic environment.
The framework for examining health reform established
in this paper outlines the process through which health
reforms are developed and implemented in post-conflict
settings and establishes the factors that are most impor-
tant in shaping the outcomes of reform - the ability of
reform to meet its objectives. This framework is pre-
sented in Figure 1, and its components are described
below.
Pressure to undertake health reform arises from prob-
lems within the health care system such as high costs,
poor performance, and poor infrastructure; as well as
concerns regarding health status. Reform measures are
composed of interventions that focus on the organisation
of the system, health financing, and the structure of pay-
ments to health care providers and institutions. The
objective of reform is to improve population health,
improve health system performance (cost effectiveness),
enhance risk protection, and heighten public satisfaction
[3].
But the implementation of reform is always more chal-
lenging than the design. The experience of health reform
in Eastern Europe (which had a similar health system
design as Kosovo and a similar reform program) points to
factors internal to the process of implementing reforms
that derailed the reform effort: short time horizons for
implementation, poor policy planning, financing reforms
that failed due to weak administration capacity, the lack
of enthusiasm for the reform program, and the difficulty
to implement organisational change. The Eastern Euro-
pean reform program also points to factors external to
health reforms, namely economic instability, unhealthy
lifestyles, the lack of government capacity to implement
reforms, and political instability all impacting on reform.
The health reform experience in Eastern Europe also
points to the important influence of multilateral organi-
zations and donor governments in shaping the reform
program [4,5].
Health reform is one component of a larger interna-
tional intervention in post-conflict societies, and needs to
be viewed as part of this larger wave of reform efforts.
Significant pressure exists for donors and international
agencies to use this opportunity to improve institutions,
rather than simply refurbish the old ones [6]. The involve-
ment of the international community brings a tremen-
Figure 1 Analysing Health Reform in Post-Conflict Settings.
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coordination of donor and non-governmental organiza-
tion activity. Due to the influx of resources and multiple
actors, evidence from previous international engage-
ments suggests that a blueprint outlining the parameters
of a future health system increases the sustainability of
health interventions. Within those blueprints, specific
health interventions are favoured by international actors,
particularly the movement towards a primary care based
system.
Moreover, the post-conflict environment is character-
ized by highly divisive politics, a weak economy, and low
government capacity, all of which impact on the imple-
mentation of reform efforts. This context creates a diffi-
cult implementing environment.
To summarize the framework presented in Figure 1,
post-conflict reform programs are launched as a result of
poor population health and the need for rehabilitation of
health infrastructure, often as a result of conflict-affected
damage. External pressures for specific reform measures
shape the selection of health interventions: the health
reform process forms a component of the international
community's effort to rebuild the state, and particular
health reform measures are favoured by international
actors. Short donor time horizons coupled with an ambi-
tious reform agenda lead to compressed time frames for
reform. Socio-economic and political forces undermine
the capacity of the state to oversee and implement reform
measures. These factors impact on the outcomes of
reform, measured by the ability of the reform program to
achieve its objectives. While reforms are launched to
improve health status, the quality of health services, equi-
table access to those services, and the cost-effectiveness
of the health system, evaluating health reform on these
outcomes presents challenges. Health status and perfor-
mance indicators can be difficult to examine due to the
absence of health and management information systems.
Moreover, the time lag between reform of the health sys-
tem and improved health outcomes can be significant -
particularly in a setting like Kosovo where chronic, rather
than infectious diseases dominate.
Background: Kosovo Health System
The health system in Kosovo, as elsewhere in Eastern
Europe, was largely based on the Semashko model of
healthcare delivery. The Semashko system of health care
was utilized throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. It centralized decision-making and emphasized
specialization of services. Polyclinics, located in major
towns and municipalities, were the first point of contact
for patients. General practitioners, dentists, paediatri-
cians, and gynaecologists all practised at these clinics,
and physiotherapy and basic diagnostic services were also
available. The central government functioned as the pur-
chaser as well as the provider of health care services.
Yugoslavia adapted the Semashko model to reflect its ver-
sion of socialism--a system of self-management. While
favouring the delivery of health care by specialists, deci-
sion-making for the system was decentralized to hospitals
and health centres. The healthcare system succeeded in
expanding the provision of healthcare, and Kosovo saw
dramatic health improvements: the mortality rate
declined from 46 per 1,000 in 1956 to 29 per 1,000 in
1990 [7].
Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo had
been granted autonomous status within the Republic of
Serbia. This status was revoked by Belgrade in March
1989, initiating a decade of tension and conflict. The
health sector became a natural battleground for the con-
flict between Kosovo's majority Albanian population and
the federal government in Belgrade. The Belgrade Minis-
try of Health assumed control of the Kosovo health sys-
tem, and directors and boards of health institutions were
forced to report directly to Belgrade. Pristina University's
medical faculty was closed, and the medical training of
many students was interrupted. Sixty-four percent of eth-
nic Albanian health workers (an estimated 2,400 people)
left their jobs: some were fired, others were subject to
smear campaigns, while others left of their own accord.
Four hundred and forty of those dismissed were specialist
physicians. The gynaecology and maternity clinics were
particularly hard hit, with all Albanian doctors working in
these units leaving their positions. Those healthcare
workers that remained in the system were required to
speak Serbian and to write in Cyrillic [7].
Access to healthcare for Albanians suffered. Many
Albanians lost their jobs after 1989, and as a result, lost
their insurance coverage. During the 1990s, more than 50
percent of Albanians lacked a social insurance card
needed to access the public health system.
To respond to this need, Albanians organized a parallel
primary healthcare system in conjunction with the paral-
lel government that was established in the early 1990s.
This system, known as the Mother Theresa Society, oper-
ated 96 clinics throughout Kosovo, many in remote areas.
Healthcare workers volunteered their services, with
financing for supplies and medicines provided by a paral-
lel tax system. Many Albanian health professionals also
established private healthcare facilities, including clinics
and laboratories, during this period.
Because Albanians were no longer able to receive medi-
cal training in their own language at Pristina University,
they also created a parallel system of medical education.
In the 1990s, 600 doctors and 1,200 nurses graduated
from this parallel system. While this system provided stu-
dents with a high degree of theoretical knowledge, clini-
cal training was problematic given the lack of access of
medical students to healthcare facilities. This left a gener-
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expertise and unrecognised qualifications.
Despite these efforts, population health deteriorated in
the 1990s. The incidence rate of infectious diseases rose,
immunisation rates declined, and vaccination coverage
for children against polio, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis,
measles, mumps, and rubella fell below 60 percent, with
some areas falling below 30 percent coverage. Polio re-
emerged, with 52 cases reported between 1990 and 1997
[7].
Armed conflict broke out in 1998 between the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav Army and
police. This conflict caused massive population displace-
ments in rural areas of Kosovo. In the fall of 1998,
UNHCR estimated that 200,000 Albanians were dis-
placed. While many civilians fled to neighbouring Alba-
nia and Macedonia, others left their villages and took
refuge in the hills of Kosovo. Health surveys showed that
displacement, as well as the violence against Albanian
civilians, took a devastating toll on population health.
Between February 1998--roughly when the conflict
between the KLA and Yugoslav authorities began--and
June 1999, when NATO forces entered Kosovo, the crude
mortality rate was 2.3 times higher than the pre-conflict
baseline. War-related trauma was the major cause of
death, with an estimated 12,000 deaths directly related to
the war. The second leading cause of mortality was
chronic disease [8].
In 1999, NATO undertook a military intervention in
Kosovo. After two and a half months of aerial bombard-
ments, the Yugoslav government agreed to the deploy-
ment of NATO troops in Kosovo and to the United
Nations administering the province. On June 10, 1999,
the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
1244, which provided the legal foundation for United
Nations control over the province. The United Nations
Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was
formed, charged with building autonomous institutions
of self-government. The mandate of UNMIK was to
administer the province, while establishing and oversee-
ing the development of provisional self-governing institu-
tions. The NATO-led KFOR (the Kosovo Force) provided
security. The international community was given sweep-
ing powers to build autonomous self-government and
undertake political, social, and economic reform.
Applying the Framework to Kosovo
Above, the paper presented a framework for analyzing
health care reform in a post-conflict setting. Below, we
apply that framework to Kosovo, beginning with an over-
view of how the health context - both health infrastruc-
ture and population health problems, combined with
external pressure for health reform to shape the selection
of health reform measures. We then overview the health
reform program, and outline the progress made toward
implementing those reform measures. In applying this
framework to Kosovo, the paper outlines how the post-
conflict political context and weak government capacity
combined to undermine progress on health reform.
Health Context: The Health System
After the war, the parallel Mother Theresa Network was
virtually abandoned. Albanian health professionals
moved back into state health facilities, while most Ser-
bian health professionals fled Kosovo - a result of the
wave of violence directed against Serbs in the post-con-
flict period. In June 1999 the majority of the staff and
patients at Pristina Hospital were Serb; by August 1999
the hospital staff and patients were almost exclusively
Albanian.
The health system had been seriously weakened by the
years of political and economic turmoil and by several
months of conflict. Over 90 percent of the clinics of the
parallel Mother Theresa Network were damaged or
destroyed during the war, and many private clinics of
Albanian health professionals had also been damaged.
While public-health facilities were spared war-related
damage, as Serbian doctors had staffed these clinics, the
vast majority of them had been looted of supplies and
equipment, and the infrastructure reflected years of
neglect. The general collapse of public-service infrastruc-
ture--particularly water and electricity--deeply affected
the health sector. Many hospitals lacked running water 24
hours a day.
Health clinics in rural areas suffered from an acute lack
of personnel and equipment. Access to emergency and
after-hours care was variable; while these services were
often accessible in large cities, they were not available in
rural areas. The availability of services through private
practice had increased dramatically-while most Albanian
health workers returned to public-health institutions,
those that had developed private practices during the
1990s maintained them.
The quality of the public healthcare system was com-
promised by several factors. Access to primary care was
inconsistent across regions and socioeconomic groups.
Shortages of health personnel in rural areas, the special-
ised nature of healthcare in Kosovo, and the lack of a
functioning referral system undermined the quality of
care. Moreover the efficiency of services was minimal.
Hospitals were composed of several separate buildings
that contained separate clinics with their own laborato-
ries, intensive-care facilities, and operating theatres. Ser-
vices among the buildings were not shared, which
resulted in duplication and inefficiency.
Kosovo also faced a shortage of physicians. The num-
ber of doctors was less than 2,500--on average 13 doctors
for every 10,000 inhabitants (the European average is
Percival and Sondorp Conflict and Health 2010, 4:7
http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/4/1/7
Page 5 of 14about 35 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants). Many doctors
had trained in the parallel system and required skills
upgrading. The exodus of Serb doctors in 1999 exacer-
bated this shortage. The number of doctors willing to
work in rural areas was minimal, and rural residents often
had to travel long distances to receive treatment.
While the shortage of physicians and the poor state of
health facilities contributed to variable access to health-
care, economic factors also impacted on the ability of
individuals to access health services. The World Bank
found that the main barrier to healthcare was cost--
despite the fact that healthcare was supposed to be free.
Twenty-eight percent of those surveyed reported that
they could not access health services due to expense.
Over 95 percent of Albanians reported buying healthcare
services, paying approximately three Euros for general
expenses and five Euros in 'gifts' to healthcare providers.
The average household spent 35 Euros annually on drugs
[9].
The healthcare system was funded by revenue out of
the Kosovo Consolidated Budget. This budget was a com-
bination of donor funds and locally collected revenue. In
the summer of 2000, the Department of Health instituted
a co-payment system to fill a financing gap and support
the primary care system (a financial penalty was incurred
if patients bypassed the primary care system). These
funding sources were inadequate, unsustainable, and
slightly regressive. Donor contributions were waning, and
both co-payments and under-the-table payments placed
a heavy burden on the poor.
Health Context: Population Health Status
With no reliable census in decades, Kosovo suffered from
a lack of basic demographic data. Surveys indicated a
young population with a mean age of 24.6 years. Twenty-
three percent of the population was thought to be under
14, while 52 percent was between the ages of 15 and 49.
The overall population balance appeared skewed: 50.3
percent of the population was male and 49.7 percent
female, with a ratio of newborn male babies to females of
106:100 [10]. Women of childbearing age (between the
ages of 15 to 45) constituted 56 percent of the female
population and 26.2 percent of the total population [11].
The validity and reliability of health data was problem-
atic, and the epidemiological situation was uncertain in
1999 and 2000. Hospital mortality studies showed that 12
percent of deaths were from communicable diseases, 53.2
percent from non-communicable diseases, three percent
from maternal conditions, 29.1 percent from neonatal
conditions (0 to 28 days of age), 3.4 percent from injuries,
and 0.6 percent from nutritional illnesses [11]. Reproduc-
tive health, as well the health of infants and children, was
a major concern.
In 1999, the infant mortality rate was 45 per 1,000
births [11] which was the highest rate in Europe, about
two or three times the rate of other South Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Perinatal mortality was also high. In
2000, Pristina Hospital had a perinatal mortality rate of
44 per 1,000. This compares to a rate of 22 per 1,000 in
1988 [12]. In the same year, Slovenia had a perinatal mor-
tality rate of 4.09 per 1,000; Croatia's rate was 9.37 per
1,000; Serbia and Montenegro's was 10.31 per 1,000; and
Macedonia's was 15.82 per 1,000. The average rate of
European Union countries was 6.78 per 1,000 [13].
Many factors contributed to these disturbing statistics,
including poor obstetric standards, inadequate medical
services, poverty, and malnutrition--as well as health
conditions such as prematurity, asphyxia, congenital
anomalies, respiratory diseases, and diarrhea [10]. Many
women lacked knowledge regarding the appropriate
treatment of diarrhea. Many mothers surveyed (54.6 per-
cent) said they stopped breastfeeding when their infant
had diarrhea [8].
Serious public-health issues faced children. Children
suffered from a high rate of diarrhea and acute respira-
tory infection, a reflection of poor sanitation, lack of
access to clean drinking water, and inadequate shelter [8].
As noted above, childhood vaccination was disrupted by
the war, and was not universal, while improper nutrition
was also a concern. Among children aged 5 to 59 months,
a UNICEF survey reported stunted growth among 10
percent of children, and mild and moderate anaemia in
16 percent of children, while more than 50 percent of
children between 6 and 12 years of age showed symptoms
of iodine deficiency [14].
Non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular,
renal, and lung disease and chronic back pain and ulcer/
gastritis were the most common adult health conditions.
Because of the high smoking rate, the incidence of cancer
and heart disease was increasing. Tobacco was a major
contributor to morbidity and mortality. Infectious dis-
eases were also problematic. The incidence of tuberculo-
sis remained high at 60 to 70 cases per 100,000. There
was a high case-fatality rate for some communicable dis-
eases such as bacterial meningitis, haemorrhagic fever,
viral meningo-encephalitis, shigellosis, and diarrheal dis-
eases [14].
External Pressures for Reform
While the Kosovo health system was in need of improve-
ment, external actors shaped the type of reform measures
selected, the scope of reform, and the timing of its imple-
mentation. Donors flooded Kosovo with billions of Euros
of assistance, and the massive influx of resources in the
immediate post-conflict period provided essential
humanitarian relief and greatly assisted the process of
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approximately 80 million Euros on the health sector,
which represented the second-largest portion of the Kos-
ovo Consolidated Budget [15]. (The largest portion was
devoted to education.)
To ensure that donor funds were coordinated and sus-
tainable, the WHO developed basic guidelines for health
projects. The "Interim Health Policy Guidelines" were
released in September 1999. These policy guidelines,
known informally as the "Blue Book," included eight
objectives:
1. Primary care would be strengthened with the
development of family-medicine teams;
2. Specialist care would be provided through referral
from primary care;
3. The size and location of facilities would be estab-
lished through the identification of population catch-
ment areas--which meant that some facilities would
be closed, while services in others would be reduced;
4. No expansion of services should be undertaken to
ensure sustainable financing. Public financing would
be maintained, but other financing models would be
studied;
5. Public provision of services would predominate;
6. Regulated private practice would be allowed;
7. An essential drugs program and a regulatory
agency would be introduced; and
8. The provision of healthcare and employment
within the system would be non-discriminatory [16].
The Blue Book was an important step in policy devel-
opment in Kosovo, based on evidence of interventions in
other post-conflict settings. It was non-binding on
donors and NGOs, but established an important frame-
work and point of reference for donor activity, guiding
many donor interventions. The WHO produced a facility
plan, which determined what facilities would remain
open, the services provided, equipment lists, and staffing
requirements.
In the summer of 2000, the WHO built on the momen-
tum created by the Blue Book and developed a more
ambitious health policy for Kosovo. WHO officials
believed that a window of opportunity existed for reform
of the healthcare system [2], a belief echoed by the World
Bank in its health-planning document:
There is a relatively brief window of opportunity dur-
ing which donors and international experts can have a
significant impact on restructuring systems and refor-
mulating policy before these systems and institutions
become entrenched and resistant to change. A strong
emphasis should be put on aid coordination to ensure
complementarity in donor initiatives and a priority
focus in view of limited implementation and policy
development capacity in Kosovo. Development sup-
port should be conditioned on policy and structural
changes aimed at providing efficiency incentives and
ensuring the long-term sustainability of effective
institutions and programs [17].
The reform plan had three main inputs. First, the WHO
assessed major population-health issues based on the
available health data. Second, they considered the vision
of European healthcare systems, as outlined in the
WHO's Health for All Policy for the Twenty-First Century.
And third, they undertook consultations with Albanian
physicians. A health-policy working group met regularly
in Pristina, while WHO officials travelled throughout
Kosovo to solicit the views of physicians practicing in
other cities and towns.
Despite efforts to consult, interviews with local stake-
holders demonstrated that they thought that UNMIK, the
WHO and international donors were behind the reforms,
with only moderate local input into the reform process.
Many stakeholders believed that the strategy was pre-for-
mulated and 'sold' during the working-group meetings.
Some participants of this working group complained that
"the policy framework was already ready, and we were
brought into the final act." However, others were more
sanguine: "The content was defined by internationals and
the decision makers were internationals. This is not
something wrong--it was positive as we did not have a
brighter vision." Some stakeholders stressed that change
was too rapid: the system was in chaos, insufficient data
existed to make decisions about reform, and little prepa-
ration was undertaken for reform implementation. And
as a result of these external pressures for reform, the
majority of central-level stakeholders interviewed
expressed doubt that the Kosovars working in the health
system were committed to reforms.
The Reform Measures: The Yellow Book's Plan
These consultations resulted in Kosovo's health-policy
document, informally known as "The Yellow Book." The
Yellow Book outlined an ambitious vision for the health
system in Kosovo, [18] and its basic components are out-
lined below.
Primary Care
The Yellow Book committed to a primary care-focused
health system. Family medicine teams operating in pri-
mary care centres would provide initial diagnoses and
curative care, with the objective of treating 80 to 90 per-
cent of presenting problems. The location of health clin-
ics would be determined on the basis of population:
facilities would have catchment populations of approxi-
mately 10,000 individuals. Larger communities would
have more extensive primary care facilities known as
'family medicine centres,' while smaller communities
would have small clinics known as 'punctas.' No expan-
sion of public clinics was deemed necessary.
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noses and curative care, including minor surgery and
drug management; emergency care and stabilisation of
emergency patients; maternal and child healthcare; and
reproductive health services, including antenatal and
post-natal care, as well as family planning and treatment
of sexually transmitted diseases. Individuals would
choose their family doctor, who would be responsible for
coordinating specialist and tertiary-care services.
Patients who bypassed the referral system would face a
financial penalty. Prevention activities such as health
education and immunisation would be run out of these
centres, as would services such as home visits, palliative
care, community rehabilitation, and community mental-
health services.
Secondary and Tertiary Care
The Yellow Book outlined a system whereby patients
would receive specialist care and hospitalisation upon
referral only, except in emergencies. Specialists who were
not working in family medicine would be hospital-based.
Outpatient specialty care would be provided at hospitals
and selected family medicine centres on referral. Six hos-
pitals would provide secondary care, and tertiary care
would be provided at one or two sites in Kosovo upon
referral only.
Hospitals in Kosovo were not cost-effective, operating
at 75 percent capacity with unnecessarily lengthy patient
stays and cumbersome physical structures. The Yellow
Book specified that hospital master plans would be writ-
ten, outlining how to increase the efficiency of hospital
services. The number of beds would be reduced in most
hospitals. In addition, future budget allocations to hospi-
tals would be based upon performance contracts and ser-
vice agreements.
Public and Environmental Health
Kosovo's Institute of Public Health (IPH) consisted of one
central institute with five regional offices. These insti-
tutes were not well connected with the rest of the health
system, their equipment obsolete, and health-informa-
tion systems not functioning. Under Kosovo's health pol-
icy, the IPH would be modernized and would concentrate
on three areas: communicable disease control, health
promotion, and water and food safety. It would also func-
tion as the technical arm of the Department of Health,
providing it with timely and accurate information on
public-health issues. The IPH would also guide and
supervise public-health activities at the district and
municipal levels.
Financing
No specific financing provisions were outlined in the Yel-
low Book. It contained a pledge that the Department
would study various funding sources. Options included
tax revenues, social insurance, voluntary contributions,
private insurance, community insurance, co-payments,
and a fee-for-service system, with the likely system being
some form of pre-payment (through compulsory or vol-
untary health insurance). Co-payments would remain in
place, as they were important sources of income and
could support health-policy goals (such as the referral
system).
Governance
The Yellow Book outlined the role of the Department of
Health, which would later be transformed into the Minis-
try of Health. Under the Kosovo health guidelines, it
would be responsible for policy, strategic planning, regu-
lation and standard setting, monitoring to ensure adher-
ence to regulations, human-resource planning, licensing,
quality assurance, and budgeting. Several institutes,
including the IPH and the Pristina University Hospital,
would report directly to the department. In line with the
European Union's principle of subsidiarity, oversight of
primary care would rest with the municipality, but the
Department of Health would ensure that municipalities
adhered to central guidelines and standards.
The Outcomes of Health Reform
Below, we assess progress made on various elements of
the reform process.
Primary Care
The reorientation of the system towards primary care
was ambitious, requiring the introduction of the family-
medicine concept; the establishment of a strong interface
between primary and secondary or tertiary levels of care;
the management of the decentralisation process to ensure
that this led to increased responsiveness to local needs
rather than a deterioration in the quality of health ser-
vices provided; and careful oversight by authorities to
ensure that physicians did not abuse their ability to work
in both the public and private sectors.
Progress has been mixed. The concept of family medi-
cine became part of the health-system lexicon. The Kos-
ovo Health Law enshrined family medicine as the
"essential form for provision of overall health care ser-
vices at the primary care level for individuals and their
families" [19]. Training programs for both physicians and
nurses were initiated. This training included manage-
ment of Kosovo's health priorities: maternal and child
health; prevention of heart and lung disease; tuberculosis;
mental health; quality of care; and patient prescriptions
[20]. The Ministry of Health established the main Centre
for the Development of Family Medicine in Pristina in
September 2002, along with eight regional Centres for
Family Medicine Training. Family medicine was intro-
duced into the curriculum of undergraduate medicine.
Despite these advances, the family-medicine system
was slow to become established. Many physicians inter-
viewed indicated that family medicine had either been
"tolerated" or "resented"; only five out of 23 who
Percival and Sondorp Conflict and Health 2010, 4:7
http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/4/1/7
Page 8 of 14responded to this question indicated that it had been
received "enthusiastically." The gate-keeping role of pri-
mary care remains underdeveloped. As one doctor com-
plained, "There is no continuity of patient follow-up,
patients come and get the referral from the family medi-
cine doctor and just go to the specialist." Family medicine
faced resistance from specialists, who believed that they
were in competition with family doctors. One stake-
holder stated, "Non-family medicine specialists oppose
the health strategy as it is based on family medicine. This
is due to a conflict of interest--less patients for special-
ists." These specialists often redirect those arriving at
hospitals to their private clinics.
Stakeholders interviewed believed the family medicine
program should have been implemented more slowly and
carefully. Members of family-medicine teams complained
that although they received training, once back in health
clinics, they returned to their old methods of work.
Regional stakeholders argued that family-medicine teams
did not function in their areas of responsibility.
Efforts to ensure that physicians did not abuse their
ability to practice in both the public and private sectors
also proved difficult. The average salary of doctors was
extremely low, with primary care doctors earning only
200 Euros per month. This created an incentive to go into
private practice, where doctors could earn many times
that amount. The Ministry of Health lacked the regula-
tory capacity to oversee these private clinics. Stakehold-
ers indicated that the quality of healthcare in the private
sector was of serious concern because regulations were
not respected.
Secondary and Tertiary Care
Reform to the secondary and tertiary levels of the health
system received significantly less attention and financial
support than primary healthcare reforms. One specialist
complained, "there is not enough information about the
future of the secondary and tertiary levels of care. No
strategic plan has been created to determine how reform
should progress."
Moreover, stakeholders believed that the Kosovar pub-
lic still perceived primary care as a stopping point on the
road to specialist care, not as a place to receive treatment.
As a result, the specialist and tertiary levels remained sig-
nificantly oversubscribed. Despite the population's con-
tinued reliance on hospitals, and the dysfunctional
referral system, the health-sector budget in Kosovo was
evenly split between primary and secondary care ser-
vices, even though secondary and tertiary care were
much more expensive [21]. This left hospitals under-
funded for their level of activity, with few resources to
maintain hospital infrastructure. While hospital master
plans were developed, the funding to implement these
plans was consistently lacking.
Public Health
Public health was made a municipal responsibility, and
municipal public-health inspectors were hired. Responsi-
bility for immunisation was transferred to primary care
facilities. A health information system was put in place,
but concerns remained regarding the ability of the IPH to
provide reliable information to the Ministry of Health,
and evidence-based policy advice.
Financing
The health system continued to be funded out of the Kos-
ovo Consolidated Budget. As taxation generated more
revenue over time, the amount of money allocated to the
health system gradually increased. The health system
received the equivalent of 41.53 million Euro in 2000,
48.5 million Euro in 2001, 40.8 million Euro in 2002, and
44.4 million Euro in 2003 [10]. These amounts remained
inadequate, and the low financial capacity of the Kosovo
government undermined the sustainability of the reform
process. According to the Ministry of Health, in 2005
Kosovo spent 6.4 percent of its GDP on health, with 2.4
percent from public resources (the Kosovo budget); 0.7
percent from donor resources, and 3.2 percent from pri-
vate sources. Private expenditure through out-of-pocket
expenses for private services and pharmaceuticals, co-
payments, and under-the-table payments was higher than
public expenditure. Total public-health expenditure was
about 22 Euro per capita--in Croatia it is about 320 Euro
per capita [10].
These additional costs for individuals attempting to
access the health system created barriers to healthcare.
This inability to access care when needed undermined
the equity of the system. While the majority of stakehold-
ers interviewed stated that the reforms provided better
access to healthcare for rural populations and women,
they argued that the reforms had resulted in less access
for poorer populations.
Significant challenges faced UNMIK in reforming
healthcare financing. Kosovo was poor, and providing
effective healthcare in the face of resource constraints
was an immense challenge. The lack of basic accounting
practices also impeded progress. Budgeting systems were
not sophisticated enough to hold institutions account-
able. Until the summer of 2001, accounts with the
Department of Health were done on Excel spreadsheets,
which allowed for significant corruption. For example,
the pharmaceutical budget was a single block allocation
without separate allocations for hospitals, municipalities,
and clinical services, and there was no coding structure
for goods and services throughout the health sector.
The World Bank funded a project designed to assess
the most appropriate financing system and implement
the basis for that system. The Bank greatly overestimated
Kosovo's governance capacity, specifically the capacity of
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(HIF). In 2000, the World Bank stated: "The top manage-
ment is highly experienced, qualified, and motivated to
resurrect Fund activities. We believe that the human
capacity of the HIF could be easily and quickly mobilized
if it were necessary" [17]. While this analysis formed the
basis for their decision to reinvigorate the social insur-
ance system, the HIF lacked the capacity to undertake
basic administrative functions. Its building was heavily
damaged during the war, and its Serb staff had fled, while
the Albanian staff who returned to HIF had been out of
the system for 10 years.
To build this capacity, the Health Care Commissioning
Agency (HCCA) was developed as a forerunner to an
insurance fund. The HCCA would initially exist within
the Ministry of Health, with plans to make it an indepen-
dent entity in the future. The HCCA would establish the
basis for the contracting of services, necessary to split the
purchaser and provider functions, with the goal of sign-
ing performance contracts with municipalities for pri-
mary care, and with hospitals for secondary and tertiary
care. The HCCA would essentially buy the services that
these institutions provided, stipulating the type and qual-
ity of service.
Progress in establishing the HCCA was hampered by
the absence of key inputs such as accurate data, informa-
tion and management systems, and reward systems. The
HCCA was also charged with the task of identifying the
basket of health services that would be provided free of
charge. This task was undermined by the lack of data on
morbidity and mortality and the lack of basic financial
data. A health-insurance law has been prepared, but as of
2009, had not been passed.
Governance
By the summer of 2001, UNMIK faced three main tasks
in the field of health. First, it administered the health sys-
tem. Second, it built the foundation for a future Ministry
of Health which required building managerial and techni-
cal capacity within the Department of Health, establish-
ing a regulatory framework for the future Ministry of
Health, developing a health-financing strategy, establish-
ing human-resource policies, exercising quality control,
oversight of the pharmaceutical sector, and regulating the
quickly growing private sector. And third, it implemented
the health-reform program.
After the central elections in November 2001, the Pro-
visional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were
established and the Ministry of Health was put in place.
The Ministry of Health had the mandate to monitor the
health situation and implement appropriate measures to
prevent and control healthcare problems, develop poli-
cies and implement legislation, coordinate activities in
the health sector including the management of healthcare
infrastructure, develop and implement norms and stan-
dards, and oversee adherence to such standards. It was
staffed by civil servants and led by an official appointed
by the Prime Minister. Internationals were transformed
from positions of authority within the Ministry to advi-
sory roles.
In the first year of its formal existence (2002), the Min-
istry was wracked by political disputes. The first Minister
was dismissed, as he reportedly did not fully respect the
Ministry's hiring procedures and had made political
appointments to the civil service. His cooperation with
donors was minimal and sometimes hostile, and he
obstructed some key developments such as the appoint-
ment of the Permanent Secretary--the highest civil ser-
vant within the Ministry of Health. The dismissal of the
Minister invoked a political crisis, which further dis-
rupted the already slow progress in fully establishing the
Ministry.
Partly as a result of these disruptions, there was little
activity in the Ministry of Health on implementing the
Yellow Book program for reform. Apart from ongoing
donor initiatives such as training of family-medicine phy-
sicians and the establishment of a health-insurance sys-
tem, little attention was paid to the Yellow Book. The
Ministry was preoccupied with keeping itself afloat
amidst scandal and a lack of leadership.
Results were also disappointing at the local level. In
some municipalities with strong political leadership and
less contentious political environments, decentralisation
did not result in a deterioration of primary care services.
In other areas, where the capacity of municipal councils
was weak, critics argued that decentralisation led to
heightened corruption and reduced access to healthcare,
particularly for minority communities. The majority of
stakeholders interviewed believed that the decentralisa-
tion of primary care services had either made no change
or had worsened the delivery of care. One stakeholder
stated, "Municipalities do not have the capacity to take on
these responsibilities. The centre does not have the
capacity to monitor municipalities and they are left to
themselves." Some stakeholders believed that responsibil-
ities should have been transferred gradually, when
municipalities developed management capabilities.
Government Capacity to Implement Reforms
The Ministry of Health had little time or human
resources to develop an implementation plan for health
reform. Under the UNMIK's Department of Health, regu-
lations were in place (although the Department had little
capacity to enforce them), a payroll established, procure-
ment of medicines and supplies undertaken, and rudi-
mentary oversight of local institutions provided.
Although the Department was successful in putting in
place a basic administrative structure and a rudimentary
regulatory framework, it did not have the capacity to plan
for or undertake reforms. No one within the UN Depart-
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donors did not provide the Department with the neces-
sary support, and the Department was woefully short-
staffed. The staff who were in place were preoccupied
with the basic tasks of administering the healthcare sys-
tem, coordinating donor/NGO activity, and beginning
the gradual process of transferring responsibility for
healthcare functions to municipalities.
The civil service was not fully established until after
central elections were held in 2001, which was a missed
opportunity to begin the process of building an indepen-
dent public service prior to the election of elected offi-
cials. Moreover, civil-service salaries were extremely low,
and government departments lacked the ability to com-
pete with international agencies for staff.
There was no official, sector-wide strategy beyond the
ambitious goals of the Yellow Book. The Ministry of
Health did not communicate its vision for healthcare.
The majority of stakeholders indicated that discussion of
the reforms with Kosovo health professionals was moder-
ate or infrequent. They expressed concern with the lack
of discussion surrounding reforms--particularly after the
initial consultations that the WHO had undertaken after
the Yellow Book was formulated. While the majority of
stakeholders also stated that the reforms were not suffi-
ciently communicated to the public, some noted that
extensive public communication was not possible at the
time.
The majority of stakeholders interviewed believed that
the Ministry did not act sufficiently to implement
reforms. This view was particularly marked among cen-
tral-level stakeholders. As one stakeholder stated, "The
Ministry did not have the capacity or will to implement
the policy. They designed regulations as they needed, but
they did not have any systematic plan in place to promote
health policy. The right people were not in the right
places." Stakeholders did not believe that the services
available at primary healthcare facilities met the objec-
tives of the reform program, and the vast majority of
stakeholders agreed that the Ministry of Health was not
able to enforce its standards in private healthcare clinics.
Government capacity was not enhanced by the activi-
ties of donors. Donors had short time horizons and dis-
persed most of their programming funds in the first two
years of the mission (1999-2001). While this ensured that
immediate humanitarian needs were met, it undermined
efforts to achieve longer-term development goals. Short
time horizons made donors risk-averse, as they had to
achieve certain objectives within a limited period of time.
Donors often had specific national objectives for their
money, including support to national non-governmental
organisations and specific national projects ('planting
their flag'). They focused on quantitative outputs, such as
the number of health clinics re-equipped, and nurses
trained. Projects that would contribute to the broader
reform process such as establishing standardized training
and building the capacity of the Kosovo civil service were
secondary considerations. While donors coordinated
their activities, they did not engage in a sector-wide
approach. Most donor funds went to hundreds of NGOs,
not the Department of Health, and donors did not report
to the Department. Coordination and collaboration was
strictly voluntary.
The contentious nature of politics in the immediate
post-conflict period also undermined Kosovo's adminis-
trative capacity. This capacity was already weak due to
the consequences of the disruption of government during
the 1990s, the inexperience of Kosovo's politicians, the
sluggish rate of the UN's establishment of government
administration, and Kosovo's economic weakness. The
ongoing struggles between Albanian political parties,
Albanians and minorities groups undermined the ability
of the Ministry of Health to implement the health reform
agenda.
Health Reform Outcomes
Table 1 (see appendix) outlines the objectives of health
reform as presented in the Yellow Book, and summarizes
progress made towards meeting these objectives. As evi-
dent in this table, family doctors have been trained,
responsibility for primary care has been transferred to
the municipal level, immunisation coverage has
increased, and some maternal and child health indicators
have improved. Yet many key reform initiatives, such as
building the strength of primary care and establishing an
effective health-financing system, were not fully imple-
mented.
What Does this Mean for Post-Conflict Reform?
Health reform is a complex undertaking, and it can take
years of resources and effort to produce meaningful
change. Yet trends in health reform can be evaluated, and
the Kosovo case study sends a cautionary note to those
planning ambitious reforms in post-conflict settings.
What Went Right
Important lessons from other post-conflict contexts were
applied in the case of Kosovo. The WHO assumed a coor-
dination function and established a strategic-planning
document to guide investments in the health sector. The
WHO formulated basic health guidelines soon after the
conflict ended. Donor funds were then used to build the
foundation for health reform. A facility master plan
guided the rehabilitation of health facilities. Weekly coor-
dination meetings were held. These important develop-
ments took place in a difficult context with a multiplicity
of donors and NGOs and a weak government in the form
of UNMIK.
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Table 1: Progress in Meeting Health-Reform Goals
Reform Objectives Reform Progress
Primary Care Location and services offered by family-
medicine centres would be based on 
population.
Family doctors would have patient lists, and be 
responsible for diagnoses and curative care, 
reproductive, maternal and child health, and 
emergency care and stabilisation. Family 
doctors would be responsible for coordinating 
specialist and tertiary-care services.
Private practice would be allowed, and 
physicians would be allowed to practise in both 
the public and private sectors, but institutions 
must be approved and regulated.
The WHO established a facility master plan 
based on capitation, which guided 
rehabilitation and staffing. In minority areas, 
some facilities were opened that were not 
included on the master plan.
Family-medicine training established.
Serious impediments exist: patient registration 
is not universal, gate-keeping role of primary 
care underdeveloped, and specialists resist 
primary care role.
Ministry lacks the capacity to regulate the 
private sector, and there are accounts of 
physicians redirecting patients from the public 
sector to their private clinics.
Secondary and Tertiary Care Patients would receive specialist care and 
hospitalisation upon referral only, except in 
emergencies.
Hospital Master Plans will establish a vision for 
increasing the efficiency of hospitals.
Patients often bypass the primary care level to 
receive direct treatment by specialists. 
Hospitals were overburdened and under-
resourced.
While Hospital Master Plans were developed, 
the Ministry lacked the resources to implement 
these plans.
Public Health The Institute of Public Health would focus on 
communicable disease control, health 
promotion, and water safety.
The institute would operate as the technical 
arm of the Department of Health, providing it 
with information on public-health issues.
Oversight of public health transferred to 
municipalities, public-health inspectors 
operate at the municipal level. Immunisation 
transferred to primary care.
Health information system established, but the 
ability of the Institute of Public Health to 
provide timely and accurate analysis to the 
Ministry of Health questioned.
Healthcare Financing No commitment was made to any financing 
system, but a pledge was made to study the 
merits of various alternatives. Some form of pre-
payment system would be established through 
compulsory or voluntary insurance. Co-
payments would be maintained.
Equity marred by significant private 
expenditures (including under-the-table 
payments)
System funded out of the Kosovo Consolidated 
Budget.
Precursor to a social-insurance system, the 
Health Care Commissioning Agency (HCCA), 
established. Establishment of the HCCA and 
performance-based contracting has been 
undermined by the absence of accurate data, 
and information and management systems.
The failure to establish a transparent 
accounting system prior to the HCCA slowed 
efforts to implement health-financing.
Organisation and Governance The Ministry of Health would be responsible for 
policy, strategic planning, and regulation and 
standard setting.
Responsibility for primary care would be 
decentralized to municipal level.
The Ministry initially undermined by political 
turmoil, including changes of Minister and 
controversy surrounding the appointment of 
senior civil servants. Turmoil undermined its 
capacity to implement reforms.
Oversight for primary care became the 
responsibility of the municipalities in 2001. 
Municipalities slow to establish oversight 
structures, and capacity of municipalities varies.
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ers in the health sector - donors, international agencies,
non-governmental organisations, and Kosovo health pro-
fessionals - with an opportunity to outline a shared vision
for the health sector. Despite the pessimism generally
expressed by stakeholders, all hoped that in 15 years the
health system would reflect the vision outlined in the
health-policy document. The health policy document
guided donor responses and ensured a degree of coher-
ence in rehabilitation and reform efforts. Training of fam-
ily doctors took place, family-medicine centres were
established, and the HCCA acted as the precursor to a
health-insurance fund. Legislation devolved responsibil-
ity for primary care and public health to the local level.
What Went Wrong: Confirming the Hypotheses
Although much was accomplished, reforms largely failed
to meet their objectives. Below, we address each hypothe-
sis and summarize the research that affirms these
hypotheses.
H1: External actors drove the health reform process: the
policies selected reflected the objectives of the interna-
tional community.
The reform program was clearly driven by the World
Health Organization and donors such as the Word Bank.
While an effort was made to consult with Albanian health
professionals, stakeholders believed that they were being
'sold' the health care program, rather than having input
into the design of the reform measures.
H2: Donors believed that reform could be achieved in a
compressed time period, and gave more priority to the
design than the implementation of reforms.
Donors and the WHO argued that an important win-
dow of opportunity existed for reform: stakeholders were
not in a position to block reform, and donor resources
were relatively plentiful. However, the capacity needed
for this type of radical change was seriously underesti-
mated. Stakeholders noted that "The health system
changed too quickly from one system to another, and
such dramatic change was impossible with all the post-
war problems."
The problems posed by the compressed time frame for
reform were exacerbated by the failure to undertake
effective policy planning. While the policy document (the
Yellow Book) was developed in consultation with donors
and health professionals, no similar process took place to
develop an implementation plan. One stakeholder com-
plained that, "there were no preparations for implementa-
tion, no assessment of financial, human or management
resources." As a result, there was little reflection about
the possible impediments to reform, and the necessary
steps to achieving reform objectives. Health reform can-
not be effectively built on a weak foundation.
H3: State capacity in the post-conflict period is low, and
external actors do not recognize the importance of state
capacity in health reform
As outlined above, the United Nations Department of
Health, and later the Kosovo Ministry of Health, was
expected to undertake three objectives: first, coordinate
donors and NGOs during the rehabilitation program;
second, oversee the administration of the health system;
and third, implement an ambitious program of reform.
The Department was expected to meet these three goals
with few resources. It was initially short-staffed and com-
pletely overstretched. While international staff provided
competent technical advice on public-health issues, they
lacked experience working within government and could
not guide the transformation of the Department into a
government ministry. Because of these weaknesses, the
Department lacked the capacity to exercise a strong plan-
ning role. There was no sector-wide planning approach,
and no implementation plan for the Yellow Book was
developed.
Capacity was further undermined by the post-conflict
political context. The health system was an important
arena for political struggle. The KLA appointed heads of
hospitals and primary clinics immediately after the war,
but many of these appointments were changed after the
rival political party - the Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK) won elections at the municipal level. After the cen-
tral elections in 2001, the new Minister of Health intro-
duced political appointments in the Ministry and
throughout the health system, which resulted in his dis-
missal. This politicisation distracted Kosovo officials
from the reform program and impeded progress towards
meeting reform goals. When the Department of Health
was transformed into a Ministry, political problems
undermined the transition process. The first Minister of
Health was dismissed for incompetence, and the most
senior civil-servant post in the Ministry--the Permanent
Secretary--remained unfilled for many months. This
political instability also contributed to slowing down the
implementation of reforms.
Figure 2 demonstrates how these factors undermined
progress in reforms, and applies the framework for ana-
lyzing post-conflict health reform to the Kosovo case
study.
Conclusion: Implications from the Case Study
This case study has both research and policy implica-
tions. It underscores the need for further study of health
reform efforts in post-conflict areas. Such case studies
could determine the role of external pressure for reform,
how such pressure influenced the time frame for reform,
and how the political environment affected the imple-
mentation of health reforms. Such studies could also
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particularly financing reforms - to establish an evidence
base for the most effective health interventions and to
ensure that such interventions enhance rather than
detract from efforts to re-establish peace in conflict-
affected societies. While dramatic health reform mea-
sures, such as those attempted in Kosovo take years to
implement, progress has not been promising, and the
Kosovo reform process should serve as a warning for
those hopeful for dramatic social change in post-conflict
periods.
This case study also has several policy implications,
although more research that corroborates these findings
is needed to strengthen the evidence base. First, while
health reform measures should reflect evidence, domestic
stakeholders know the implementing environment better
than representatives from donor and multilateral agen-
cies. Health reform measures must be revised to reflect
the concerns and reservations of stakeholders. Second,
although rebuilding the health system should be guided
by a clear plan, more attention needs to be paid to ensur-
ing that sufficient resources, time, and capacity exist to
implement the plan. The focus should be on the building
blocks of a health system such as health financing and
information systems, and ensuring that the timeframe for
health reform is realistic given the social, political and
economic context. And third, the state is an integral com-
ponent of any health system. Post-conflict reconstruction
efforts need to either contribute to building state capacity
or incorporate weak state capacity into the design of
health reform measures.
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Figure 2 Application of the Conceptual Framework to Kosovo 
Case.
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